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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's order denying his untimely 
motion for a new trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
As related by the district court: 
The Defendant Dana Lydell Smith was convicted of Grand Theft 
following a jury trial in this case. On March 31, 2008, the court sentenced 
the Defendant to a unified term of confinement of fourteen years, with 
seven years determinate, and committed the Defendant to the custody of 
the Idaho Board of Correction to serve his sentence. The Defendant 
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his judgment of 
conviction in an unpublished opinion filed May 20,2009. 
(R., p.23.) Remittitur in the appeal was entered on June 17, 2009. (Docket Nos. 
36216/35604 Rem ittitur. 1) 
On January 19, 2012, Smith filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that he had 
newly discovered evidence which required a new trial in the interest of justice. (R., p.1.) 
Smith had filed at least five prior motions for a new trial in this case, all of which were 
previously denied. (R., p.23.) The district court, finding that Smith's January 19, 2012 
motion for a new trial was not filed within the two-year time period prescribed by Idaho 
Criminal Rule 34, denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely and the district 
court was therefore without jurisdiction to consider it. (R., pp.23-24.) Smith filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.26-29.) 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court, in an order dated April 13, 2012, took judicial notice of 
Smith's prior appeals. 
1 
ISSUE 
Smith states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in concluding that the motion for a new trial 
was untimely and that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed? 
(Appellant's brief, p.1.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Smith failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of 
his untimely motion for a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
Smith Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Denial Of 
His Untimely Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Smith was convicted by a jury of grand theft and the district court entered 
judgment on March 31, 2008. (R., p.23.) Smith filed an appeal, which was denied on 
May 20, 2009 (ld.), with remittitur entering on June 17, 2009 (Docket Nos. 36216/35604 
Remittitur). On January 19, 2012, Smith filed a motion for new trial, claiming to have 
discovered new evidence. (R., p.1.) The district court denied Smith's motion on the 
basis that it was untimely. (R., pp.23-24.) Smith challenges the district court's ruling on 
appeal (Appe"ant's brief, pp.2-7), but he has failed to establish an abuse of discretion in 
the district court's denial of his untimely motion for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's discretion 
and wi" not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v. Jones, 
127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 
P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Smith's Untimely Motion For A New Trial 
Idaho Code § 19-2406 provides the circumstances under which a district judge 
has discretion to grant a new trial. One such circumstance occurs "[w]hen new 
evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not with 
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). 
Idaho Code § 19-2407 provides that "[t]he application for a new trial may be made 
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before or after the judgment; and must be made within the time provided by the Idaho 
criminal rules unless the court or judge extends the time." In conjunction with these 
statutes, Idaho Criminal Rule 34 prescribes the time limits for filing motions for new trial, 
providing, in relevant part, "[a] motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly 
discovered evidence may be made only before or within two (2) years after final 
judgment.. .. " I.C.R. 34. 
Judgments become final at the expiration of the time to file an appeal or upon the 
entering of remittitur if the defendant files an appeal. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 
352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). Smith appealed from the underlying judgment, that 
appeal was denied on May 20, 2009, and remittitur entered on June 17, 2009. (Docket 
Nos. 36216/35604 Remittitur.) Smith's motion for a new trial, filed on January 19, 2012, 
was therefore not filed within the time limits prescribed by Rule 34. See I.C.R. 34; State 
v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40,42, 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2002). Because Smith's motion 
for a new trial was untimely, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Jakoski, 
139 Idaho at 354-55,79 P.3d at 713-14; Parrot, 138 Idaho at 42,57 P.3d at 511. The 
district court, after noting the relevant legal standards, properly denied Smith's motion 
for a new trial on the basis that it was untimely. (R., pp.23-24.) The district court should 
be affirmed. 
On appeal, Smith acknowledges that his motion for a new trial was filed more 
than two years after his conviction became final and recognizes that precedents of both 
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Davis, 8 Idaho 115, 66 P. 932 (1901), and the 
Court of Appeals in State v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42, 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 
2002), support the district court's order. (Appellant's brief, p.2.) Smith argues that 
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these cases should be overturned, because, he alleges, Davis is "anachronistic" and 
Parrott is contrary to the law. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-7.) 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents. The rule of stare 
decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." 
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 
657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 
Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("prior decisions of this Court should govern unless 
they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. 
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this 
question, and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
Court must be] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as 
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."). Smith has failed to show that the precedents 
articulated in Davis and Parrott should be overturned. 
First, the legal standard for overturning precedent does not recognize cases 
being old as grounds for their reversal. Smith has therefore failed to show any basis for 
reversal of Idaho's longstanding precedent, originally articulated in Davis, that motions 
for an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial must be filed within the time limits 
outlined in Rule 34. Second, despite Smith's arguments to the contrary, Davis and 
Parrott are consistent with the applicable statutes, which explicitly authorize the courts 
through their rules to determine the time limits for filing motions for new trial. See I.C. § 
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19-2407. Smith has failed to show any basis for overturning the precedent articulated in 
Davis and Parrott. 
Moreover, the grounds on which Smith attacks Davis and Parrott are unavailing 
in this case. Smith alleges that the Court of Appeals in Parrott "read an additional 
requirement into the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, requiring that any 
motion to extend the time for filing a new trial motion based upon newly discovered 
evidence be filed within the original two years allowed for a filing of a new trial motion." 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) The district court did not rely on Parrott for that proposition; 
rather it cited it for the proposition that "[f]inal judgment is deemed to occur when a 
defendant's direct appeal is resolved." (R., p.24.) Because Smith does not challenge 
that holding from Parrott, the challenge he raises to these cases cannot ultimately show 
an abuse of discretion by the district court in denying the untimely motion. 
Finally, Smith's challenge to Davis and Parrott, based on his argument that 
requiring that motions to extend the time for filing a motion for new trial be filed within 
the time limits prescribed by Idaho Criminal Rule 34 somehow violates Idaho Code § 
19-2407, is not properly before this Court. Smith never filed a motion to extend the time 
for filing his motion for a new trial. (See generally R.) The district court, therefore, was 
never presented with this issue below. "The longstanding rule of this Court is that [it] 
will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeal." State v. Draper, 
151 Idaho 576, 593, 261 P.3d 853, 870 (2011) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 
53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287 (2003)). Because Smith did not present this issue to the 
district court by filing a motion to extend the time limits for filing his motion for a new 
trial, it is not preserved for appeal. 
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The district court properly denied Smith's untimely motion for a new trial, and 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Smith's untimely motion for new trial. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 2012. 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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